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t the conclusion of Dionne Brand’s latest and much dis-
cussed novel What We All Long For, Carla, one of the main 
characters, makes some positive plans for the future just as her 
brother Jamal commits a brutal beating — one that will likely prevent 
these plans from ever being realized. This beating is significant for 
Carla not only because she is the sibling of the main aggressor, but also 
because Jamal’s victim is the brother of her best friend, next-door neigh-
bour, and sometimes lover, Tuyen. When Jamal begins to “beat [Quy] 
and kick him beyond recognition” (317), Carla is at her apartment, 
planning to “have parties with Tuyen,” to “go to the Roxy Blu” and to 
“jazz concerts,” to “wait in line to hear U2,” to “cut her hair,” to “check 
out the open-mike spoken word at Caliban,” and to “go with Tuyen to 
Pope Joan” and “Afrodeasia” where “They’ll dance together.” This list of 
imagined future endeavours, many of which have queer or postcolonial 
affiliations, ends provocatively with, “She’ll be seduced by someone.” In 
her words, what Carla’s anticipated activities and her capacity to imagine 
them amount to is a newly realized desire to “live her life” (315).
As the final pages of the novel make clear, Carla’s future plans are 
connected not to some sort of realization of a queer-Caribbean-Italian-
Canadian identity (a good old-fashioned “coming out,” so to speak). 
Nor are they the result of a perceived shift toward greater acceptance 
and understanding in Carla’s social environment that makes Carla feel 
somehow more welcome to enter it as a queer woman with a mixed 
racial and cultural background. Rather, at this crucial moment of the 
novel’s conclusion, the Carla who has said that she feels “no desire” 
(52) (despite the fact that she sometimes responds positively to Tuyen’s 
advances) becomes a person who plans to “be seduced by someone” 
because she no longer feels that she can (or that she must) take respon-
sibility to care for her younger brother. Ever since her mother, Angie, 
asked five-year-old Carla to “hold the baby” right before she jumped off 
of their apartment balcony (103), Carla has felt that Jamal is primarily 
48 Scl/Élc
hers to worry about (even though, after Angie’s death, they were both 
raised by their biological father and his wife in a middle-class neigh-
bourhood). Making plans for the future, deciding to “live her life,” is 
directly connected to Carla’s resolution that “She can’t hold the baby 
anymore” (315). However, this burden from which Carla finds herself 
liberated is not limited to the responsibility of caring for an individual 
(a baby brother) and the pressure to honour the wishes of another indi-
vidual (her mother) that is always inevitably part of this responsibil-
ity. Carla’s newfound perspective at the end of the novel must also be 
read as the result of a shift in Carla’s relationship with the role of the 
child as a normative figure in the social imaginary of the twenty-first 
century Canadian urban environment in which she lives. Specifically, 
Carla’s resolution highlights how this child figure, and the imagination 
of a particular future into which this figure will mature, places certain 
restrictions upon the childhood experiences and maturation potential of 
immigrant and racialized children in Canada. While the novel stands 
in opposition to these restrictions, it does not counter them by arguing 
for the inclusion of all children in an imagined better future. Instead, 
Brand’s text is invested in the critique of this very assumption that the 
future can be imagined. 
This essay explores What We All Long For’s attention to temporal-
ity through a race-conscious critique of what Lee Edelman has termed 
“reproductive futurism.” In other words, the discussion that follows 
brings race to bear on a branch of queer theory that has been critiqued 
for the lack of attention it pays to the intersections between racism and 
homophobia. If the initial response to Edelman was critical, however, 
his analysis of the role of the child figure in normalizing time and 
restricting notions of futurity has since become prevalent in scholar-
ship that crosses the threshold between queer theory and critical race 
theory. This scholarship makes possible my own project here, which is to 
initiate an overdue conversation about how race and queerness function 
together within the normative construction of time in What We All Long 
For. Critics have certainly already noted Brand’s emphasis on futurity,1 
yet more remains to be said on the question of what “the future” can 
mean for characters like Carla and Jamal. With the analytical space 
opened up by recent critical applications of the “no future” thesis to 
the issue of race, an assessment of futurity in Brand’s novel has become 
important for its methodological implications as well as its social ones. 
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Race and the Future
Edelman argues that the figure of “the Child” serves as a placeholder of 
identity. This child figure is oriented toward a future that is assumed to 
be known, and, as such, has the power to limit the possibilities for the 
political realm to become other than itself (i.e., other than that which 
categorizes people and subsequently excludes those who meet certain 
categorical criteria). As Edelman explains, “the fantasy subtending the 
image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political 
itself must be thought,” in the sense that “politics, however radical the 
means by which specific constituencies attempt to produce a more desir-
able social order, remains, at its core, conservative insofar as it works to 
affirm a structure, to authenticate social order, which it then intends to 
transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child” (No Future 2-3). 
This orientation toward a future that is desirable, and therefore appar-
ently knowable, forecloses upon the possibility that these efforts can 
successfully produce a greater amount of inclusivity in the future, even 
when that possibility is the very premise upon which this desire for the 
future takes place. 
Applying this critique of reproductive futurism to Brand’s work is 
somewhat contentious since Edelman has been criticized for his lack 
of attention to race. For those concerned with queer theory’s apparent 
reluctance to embrace intersectionality, such as Jose Muñoz, Edelman 
belongs to a set of “gay white male scholars who imagine sexuality as a 
discrete category that can be abstracted and isolated from other antag-
onisms in the social, which include race and gender” (Muñoz 826, n. 
1). Another criticism of the “no future” thesis is that Edelman’s theory 
and its promotion of “self-dissolution” can “only be undertaken from 
a position of relative security” and that, therefore, it remains unwork-
able for “deprivileged subjects — some women, racially and ethnic-
ally marked individuals, and those who lead economically precarious 
lives” (Ruti 116). While these critiques have played an important role 
in shaping queer theory in the wake of Edelman’s No Future, they also 
risk reinserting the very structures at which the emphasis on negativity 
in queer politics takes aim. Consequently, they miss an opportunity 
to respond to texts such as What We All Long For, which highlights 
the necessity of a theory of childhood associated with negativity for 
an analysis of its “precarious” and “deprivileged” characters like Jamal 
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— and also like the other little brother of the novel, Quy — who are 
uncannily childish beyond their years. 
 Perhaps the most valuable benefit of the critique of reproductive 
futurism to What We All Long For is this critique’s refusal to entertain 
any suggestion that Carla’s decision to “live her life” signals a positive 
development in her character at the end of the novel. In its wording, 
Carla’s decision resonates with Judith Butler’s notion of “livability,”2 
which describes the circumstances by which subjects (and Butler is 
particularly interested in minoritized queer subjects) are able to “enter 
into the political field” (29). Notably, for Butler, “livability” is achieved 
through an “aging process” where “aging” does not mean to grow up 
into a prescribed form of maturity but rather to grow into the other, 
into the unknown, “to feel the surety of one’s epistemological and onto-
logical anchor go” and “embrace the destruction and rearticulation of 
the human” (35). Criticism on Brand’s novel, in large part, has focused 
on this political potential of letting go of one’s “anchor.” Kit Dobson, for 
example, applies Marlene Goldman’s claim that Brand’s earlier writing 
connotes a “politics of drifting” to What We All Long For, extending this 
argument further by insisting that Brand’s “liberated notion of selfhood 
risks becoming reinscribed by a placid sense of globalism if analysis fails 
to note that deterritorialization and drifting need to be ongoing pro-
cesses” (181).3 Dobson’s particular insistence that the deterritorialization 
effected by this drifting process be a “continual project” is crucial to my 
own discussion here because it marks the point where Carla’s decision 
to “live her life” departs from Butler’s notion of livability (181). In fact, 
much like recent scholarship that critiques Butler specifically for her 
ultimate adherence to a “developmental model of political subjectivity” 
(Berlant 181), despite her alternative take on “aging,” Dobson’s emphasis 
on the “ongoing” wards off a consideration of drifting as a temporary 
condition, as merely one segment of a process that will eventually result 
in some sort of mature subject, or society. In the case of Carla, it seems 
especially crucial to acquire such an interpretive resilience in the face of 
whatever readerly tendency there might be to understand the ending as a 
sign that Carla has resolved her childhood dilemmas (and the tendency 
to lament the possibility that Jamal’s violence will destroy this suppos-
edly positive turn in Carla’s future outlook).4 To take this a step further, 
if Carla’s decision is a queer one, it might even be likened more to a fail-
ure than to a success, insofar as failure, according to Judith Halberstam, 
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“allows us to escape the punishing norms that discipline behaviour and 
manage human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly 
childhoods to orderly and predictable adulthoods” (Queer Art 3). In 
what sense might Carla’s decision express and subvert the disciplinary 
measures to which her own development was subject? How might her 
decision be understood to fail at least as much as to succeed? 
As the above discussion indicates, queer theory’s continued applica-
tions and reconfigurations of the “no future” thesis reach far beyond 
the shortcomings of Edelman’s No Future while maintaining a critical 
insistence upon negativity, destruction, and anti-progressive models of 
human subjectivity in relation to time. The analysis that follows draws 
specifically from recent scholarship by Katherine Bond Stockton and 
Valerie Rohy that explores the usefulness of anachronism and other 
alternative temporalities for contemporary intersectional politics. In 
What We All Long For, alternative conceptions of time appear in several 
forms, from the characters’ own embodiments of time as they leave (or 
refuse to leave) childhood behind, to the recurrence of anachronistic 
figures (specifically the ghost and the baby-faced adult), to the ending 
with its compellingly negative representation of the future of the novel’s 
youth. 
“So Childish”
The figure of the child is, in fact, an obsession of several of the char-
acters in the novel. On average, every fourteen pages, someone calls 
someone else “childish” or admits to feeling that way, beginning with 
Tuyen’s complaint that her brother is “so childish” (12) and continuing 
on so that all of the novel’s main characters have the term applied to 
them at least once. The charge seems in some ways fitting: these char-
acters, ages twenty-three to twenty-five, steal liquor and money from 
their parents, and they worry over the extent to which they desire their 
parents’ “approval” (14, 257). Now that their official childhood years 
have passed, they refuse to strive for the “regular” work- and family-
related goals of proper adulthood. Tuyen is an artist who lives partly off 
her family’s money, which she is sometimes given and sometimes takes; 
Oku is a graduate school drop-out who lives at home and uses his stu-
dent loan for spending money; Jackie runs a second-hand clothing shop 
in a transitional downtown neighbourhood; and Carla is a bike courier. 
None of these characters entertains thoughts of career advancement, 
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marriage, property ownership, or parenthood — not even as a vague 
hope, or fear, for the future. 
The four characters have been friends since their school days when 
they were “spectators to the white kids in the class” (20). With this 
phrase, What We All Long For foregrounds Stockton’s recent argument 
that historically “children as an idea are likely to be both white and 
middle-class” (31). To borrow further from Stockton, “the child queered 
by colour” (32) in this novel seems intended to grow up into a racialized 
straightness, which, of course, this child can never totally assume. The 
child raced as other-than-white, then, becomes the hero of a narrative of 
social improvement in which its development must display the success 
of Canada’s efforts to promote social equality. Within this narrative, 
this exemplar child’s progress through time stands as an indicator that 
immigrants and immigrant families can be “successful” — that is, suc-
cessful according to Canada’s measure, and thus, of course, never part 
of, let alone equal to, the political body that takes this measure.
Even Tuyen seems to subscribe to this narrative of immigrant 
improvement when she assesses her brother Quy: “Yes,” she reasons, 
“of course there were stories of refugees made good no matter what the 
circumstances.” But she immediately recants this with, “God. What 
did she mean, made good? That was so weak” (300). Tuyen’s initially 
unconscious articulation of this assumption that refugees need to be 
“made good” echoes discourse surrounding late-twentieth- and early-
twenty-first-century immigration in Canada, which makes continual 
use of the trope of temporal progress. As Daniel Coleman explains, 
“The discourse of Canada’s maturity continues to this day to be prem-
ised upon the extension of civil treatment to non-White strangers” (209). 
This “allegory of maturation,” or what, in a similar argument, Donna 
Pennee terms the “rhetoric of maturity,” is readily apparent in such 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada publications as Planning Now for 
Canada’s Future and Growing Together: A Backgrounder on Immigration 
and Citizenship (Coleman 209; Pennee 91). From the perspective of 
these documents, the future looks positive if it forecasts social and eco-
nomic gains accomplished by those who are new to Canada (and there-
fore gains from which Canada’s economy also benefits) and negative if it 
projects economic downturns and other such factors (factors which then 
become arguments for reducing immigration levels). Peter S. Li critiques 
the “benchmarks” by which the Canadian government measures immi-
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grant “success,” arguing that “despite the policy objective of defining 
integration as a two-way street that requires the accommodation and 
adaptation on the part of immigrants as well as Canadian society, it is 
immigrants and not Canadian society or institutions that are seen as 
needing to change” (52). In other words, Canadian public policy still 
affirms the existence of a Canadian norm to which newcomers will 
adapt, and its use of terms like “growth” to reference this adaptation 
suggests that this assimilation is natural and inevitable. 
Also relevant in the context of Brand’s novel is the fact that govern-
ment publications on immigration contain several photographs of chil-
dren; in fact, in the two pamphlets referenced above, the photographs 
are almost exclusively of children. The benchmarks for these children 
adhere quite closely to a normative temporal trajectory of life events.5 
Canadian studies on the “progress” of second-generation immigrants 
use a normative model of temporal advancement to measure the suc-
cess of immigrant “integration.” A case in point is the 2007 study of 
Canadian second-generation children of immigrants by Jeffrey Reitz 
and Rupa Banerjee. While David Chariandy emphasizes this study’s 
analysis of the extent to which young second-generation Canadians feel 
like they belong (see “The Fiction”), also significant is that the study 
sought to account for the “slower integration of visible minorities” into 
Canadian society, as compared to the apparently faster integration of 
white immigrants (Reitz and Banerjee 522). In a similar vein, Nicholas 
Keung’s article on Reitz and Banerjee’s findings considers the apparently 
abnormal speed at which immigrant women become wives and mothers 
when it suggests that the reason second-generation women were mak-
ing more money than second-generation men on average at the time of 
this study “could be attributed to [the women’s] access to better-paying 
jobs in major urban centres, as well as their delayed marriage and child-
birth.” The study and the responses to it confirm that the immigrant 
experience in Canada is considered knowable and evaluable by the meas-
urement of the second-generation’s accomplishments of pre-established 
goals along a concordantly pre-established timeline. 
Efforts to make immigrant experience better over time may be 
necessary and important, but what constitutes “better” also requires 
some rethinking.6 When Tuyen resorts to stereotypes of immigrant 
improvement, she exhibits her internalization of this particular future-
as-progress concept that the Canadian social body harbours for immi-
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grants. Note as well that, according to Tuyen, this mentality is per-
petuated through “stories,” where the progressive temporal convention 
of a narrative-based genre maintains the stereotype, even when the 
person calling to mind these stories has little faith in their content. In 
this respect, Tuyen’s critique of “stories of refugees made good” echoes 
Steven Bruhm and Natasha Hurley’s argument about the arc of narra-
tives that get told about queer children. “How the story is conveyed,” 
Bruhm and Hurley write, “carries the moral weight of creating the sta-
tistically ‘normal’ child” (x). In a similar vein, Rohy has pointed out in 
her study of the temporal convention of evolutionary theory ascribed 
to race and queerness that literature “introduces its own time lines” in 
part through “the conventions of narrative form” (xii). Interestingly, 
Quy expresses his own contempt for this form when he ends his opening 
first-person narration in the book with the curiously repetitive “What 
happened next? What happened next happened” (10). Even though Quy 
does know what happened next at this point in his narrative (because he 
is describing experiences from his past), his answer makes it clear that 
the “next” of temporal progression supersedes even the content of that 
“next.” But at the same time, when Quy was a young child refugee (as 
he is in this first segment of his story that he recalls to readers) he would 
not have known what was going to happen next, and so his response 
here also reproduces for his readers this sense of unknowing. As in the 
case of queer children in Stockton’s analysis, Quy was “growing toward 
a question mark” (3). But this phrase might best apply not to Quy, who 
lived in a diasporic Asia where the future was unknowable for many 
people, but rather to the other characters in the novel who saw that their 
peers felt they knew to some extent what they were “growing” toward, 
and were persistently conscious of the fact that, as racialized youths of 
immigrant parents, they were never going to be fully part of this future 
of white children. As Chariandy aptly argues, the
disaffection and alienation of the youths in the novel would appear 
to stem not from their ‘ethnic incompatibility’ with dominant 
society, but from their belief (quite likely borne from the crush of 
everyday experience) that they eternally will be regarded, in their 
country of birth, as outsiders. (“The Fiction” 825)
The distinction Chariandy makes rests on the word “eternally,” sug-
gesting that it is the factor of time, and change through time which 
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they are refused, that affects the lives of these characters, and not the 
issue of their difference and “incompatibility” alone. All in all, through 
What We All Long For, Brand offers a response not just to the question 
of how second-generation immigrants are faring in Toronto, but also to 
the following questions that Stockton poses about the function that race 
plays within the conventions of heterosexual temporality: “how does 
innocence, our default designation for children, cause its own violence?” 
and, “how do children of color display that their inclusion in ‘the future 
of our children’ is partial, even brutal?” (5). 
The Ghost and the Baby Face 
Carla’s brother Jamal is someone whose own acts of violence stem from 
this brutality of being refused complete inclusion in the Canadian nar-
rative of growth. This is represented in the fact that Jamal remains 
childlike even though he is legally an adult. According to Oku, Jamal 
is “a young black man-child who’s fucked just like the rest of us” (48). 
Carla laments that even though Jamal is eighteen, he cannot “take care 
of himself yet,” so that she has “to look out for him as one would a baby 
with a baby’s recklessness” (29). She is also concerned that, for Jamal, 
everything is “immediate . . . everything in the moment” (32). To return 
to Edelman, if the child figure functions as the placeholder of the future 
and of the future continuation of existing (i.e., inequitable) social struc-
tures, then Jamal embodies this childishness where it does not belong 
(because Jamal is eighteen) but also where it does belong in the sense 
that he is the figure who is not allowed to grow up. The fact that he is 
childlike reaffirms the conventions of this figure but in such a way as to 
expose this convention for its racial discrepancies and ultimately render 
it disturbing because it showcases the necessary subversion of temporal-
ity as being also at the heart of the experience of the child who is racial-
ized as non-white. Insofar as Jamal’s actions determine the ending of 
the novel, it is important to note the extent to which this ending has to 
do with a particular sort of child in Carla’s life, one who has remained 
a child — a “baby,” in fact — even as he approaches his twenties. 
Jamal’s baby-like features and habits make him an anachronistic 
figure, and so it is fitting that the other figure associated with him 
— that of the ghost — is similarly a figure of temporal asynchrony. 
Jamal is given the name “ghost” in prison, and he imprints this name 
on his physical body in the form of the rough figure of a “G” branded 
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under his left shoulder. This association with ghostliness redoubles the 
uncanny asynchrony already established by the childishness that Jamal 
cannot shake off or surpass. It also makes him a fitting example of 
Stockton’s “child queered by innocence” (one so innocent that adults 
are disconcerted by it), who maintains “a telling kind of ghostliness 
[about his] growth” (6). At the same time, Jamal is also an example of 
Stockton’s “child queered by colour,” one who, as in Blake’s poem “The 
Little Black Boy,” is barred from the privilege of being innocent even 
when he is a child (32). Through Jamal, Brand plays with the racialized 
nature of this innocence/experience dichotomy. Jamal embodies the 
paradox that he could never be an innocent boy or an experienced adult 
because of his race, so that upon reaching eighteen, he appears naive, 
and his experience is connected with guilt and crime, and seemingly far 
removed from wisdom and maturity.
Perhaps it is the case with Brand, as Winfried Siemerling has sug-
gested, that “the younger generation” in What We All Long For “seems 
to define itself largely by seeking to exorcize what she calls [in A Map 
to the Door of No Return] ‘the ghost of old cities’” (Brand, A Map 110; 
Siemerling 111). Chariandy also points out that this “diasporic haunting 
and, indeed, violent return of the untold legacies of the elsewhere past 
can be found throughout the novel.” He suggests that this haunting 
occurs “most significantly in the actions and identity of Jamal, a black 
youth caught up in violent and self-destructive criminal activities, who 
very tellingly brags that others fearfully refer to him as ‘ghost’” (“The 
Fiction” 826). Yet, Jamal-as-ghost is not entirely a figure of the “old” or 
the “past” that haunts the present; rather his ghostliness represents that 
which is impossible to know about him, his unknowability that is the 
result of his being subject to racialization. “Race,” as Grace Kyungwon 
Hong has recently argued, “is one of the names for what has been ren-
dered unknown and unknowable through the very claim of totalizing 
knowledge” (35). It is “a kind of ghost: almost inarticulable, always slip-
ping away. It is almost always misrecognized as something more solid, 
something more knowable”7 (38). For Hong, the figure of the ghost 
expresses how race is neither that which was defined by the oppres-
sor nor that which our present systems of knowledge can purport to 
discover. In this context, it is worth noting that Carla has trouble with 
Jamal’s new signifier. “Ghost my ass,” she thinks to herself, “His ghost-
liness didn’t stop the police from finding him” (37). What the police 
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“find” when they apprehend Jamal is what they are looking for — in 
Hong’s terms the “more solid” and “more knowable” stereotype of the 
violent black male Toronto youth. By contrast, Jamal’s ghostliness can 
be taken to signify that which cannot be known. 
Jamal is not the only childlike ghost in the story. Tuyen’s brother 
Quy, who was separated from his parents on their journey from Vietnam 
to Canada, and who remains in Asia until he is an adult, is “the ghost in 
[Tuyen’s] childhood” (266). Of course, as a memory, he is permanently 
a child in his family’s eyes, but even when he returns, Tuyen notes that 
his face is “the face of a boy, a baby, innocent and expectant. There was 
something wrong about it. It didn’t go with the rest of his body” (208); 
it “was like an angel or a ghost or a child” (224). Not only is Quy left 
behind in Vietnam, but he is left behind in time as well. Although she 
is suspicious of it, Tuyen finds herself “drawn to the babyness of the face 
against the body springy as violence” (227). As Edelman argues, just 
as the negation of the child figure, or the assumption of that queerness 
against which the social identifies, has the power to exceed even that 
role of being the supporting opposite of the identifiable and coherent 
social body, here Quy’s baby face persists in defiance of his own experi-
ences, and his own history. Several years later, he is still the child his 
parents remember — but this embodiment must be external to the line 
of conventional temporal progress: in other words, what’s so interesting 
about this image is that it both satisfies and subverts the idealization of 
the child. Even Quy does not recognize his own face in the mirror — he 
says, “I’ve managed to change everything except that face” (284). Even 
though his “body has done everything hurtful,” his “face keeps hang-
ing on” (284). Heather Smyth has commented on the fact that Quy’s 
“body and face do not match” and has argued that this incongruity 
“makes him a composite exquisite corpse, mirroring the violence done 
to his own and others’ bodies in his presence” (287). She goes on to 
point out that “Quy’s life-threatening beating by Jamal (perhaps his 
death) at the moment of his reunion with his parents suggests that he 
is incommensurable: he represents the loss or sacrifice of what is left 
behind in diaspora, but also perhaps the absence of what cannot be car-
ried forward” (287). The irony is that while Quy’s physiognomy does 
not qualify him as “grown-up,” his youth and early adulthood spent 
working for smugglers and traffickers in Asia — all that “is left behind 
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in diaspora” — in fact make him much more “experienced” than those 
who do live according to this ideal of being grown-up.
The critical discussion surrounding the political significance of the 
ghost-as-anachronism posits that ghosts challenge the convention of 
temporal progression and the social structures that this convention 
serves to maintain. But Rohy complicates this discussion by question-
ing the viability of anachronism for intersectional politics. Rohy histori-
cizes the parallels between the notion of temporal progress (and regres-
sion) issued by scientific racism on the one hand, and the sexologists 
on the other. The latter, as Rohy shows, theorized homosexuality along 
the same conventions of evolutionary progress that informed scientific 
racism:
Theories of queer backwardness conceived what we now call homo-
phobia in the image of racist discourses, particularly those con-
cerned with Africans and African Americans, who were the para-
digmatic figures for racial alterity in the U.S. national imaginary 
and most closely linked with temporal rhetoric. Adopting concepts 
from evolutionary science, such theories . . . construed same-sex 
desire as a regression both in individual development (to immature 
stages of life) and in human history (to primitive societies or van-
ished cultures). (ix-x)
On the topic of the potential for temporal asynchronies to subvert this 
convention-affirming parallel between race and homosexuality, how-
ever, Rohy writes that “Anachronism is not merely the necessary other of 
straight time; it is always inside normative temporality” and, moreover, 
that “the anachronism assigned to blackness and queerness is in fact 
not external, but internal to and constitutive of the white, heterosexual 
norm” (xv). Rohy’s assessment here gives some pause to my analysis 
of Brand’s novel thus far. The examples of the persistence of child-
like characters in the novel, Tuyen’s critique of the social demand that 
refugees be “made good,” and, finally, the novel’s two childlike ghost 
characters, should not automatically qualify as politically subversive. 
In many respects, Brand’s temporal asynchronies function to make the 
convention more identifiable, but they do not go further to exceed or 
resist it. If the child figure is meant to be the confirmation that existing 
social structures will persist into the future, then the childlike figures 
of Brand’s novel express the illogic of this belief by depicting the bodies 
of children that have uncannily persisted into the future (rather than 
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having grown up). Quy and Jamal show up the paradox of “the children 
are the future” thinking by looking like children (babies, in fact) despite 
their own best efforts to age. The effect of this paradox is that their 
childishness reads as anachronistic, and in so doing, it shows the child/
adult spectrum, which is also the innocence/experience spectrum, to be 
a racist and homophobic social convention. In fact, it is in the context 
of this temporal structure ascribed to identity, and the progressions 
from innocence to experience it permits, that this novel makes its most 
striking political intervention. Through and beyond these representa-
tions of asynchronic, ghostly children, the most compelling resistance 
to reproductive futurism that Brand mounts in this novel has to do with 
this question of the knowability of the future that informs the novel’s 
ending.
The End
Jamal-as-ghost and Quy-as-ghost demonstrate how the embodied dis-
play of innocence occurring somehow outside of its proper time exposes 
the racialized aspects of the temporal conventions of childhood and 
“growing up,” and also points toward the unknowability of race in the 
present critical moment. This ghostly disruption of time also affects the 
events surrounding Carla’s decision to live her life at the conclusion of 
the novel. While Carla seems somewhat invested in the future as the 
novel draws to a close, in fact, her positioning and the perspective she 
assumes when the novel concludes can also be read as an extension of 
What We All Long For’s critique of reproductive futurism. 
Diana Brydon has argued that the ending disrupts any investment in 
futurity the novel otherwise seems to uphold. Rather than “move from 
loss to restoration,” she writes, “Brand’s novel snatches the moment 
away just when it seems within her characters’ grasp” (106). In Brydon’s 
reading, the novel “ends with Carla awaiting Tuyen’s return, not yet 
informed of her brother Jamal’s violent attack on Quy” (105). For 
Brydon, Carla’s knowledge of Jamal’s actions is decided, and decided 
in the negative. Brydon goes on to describe the ending as follows: 
The lost opportunities of this ending (for Quy and his “family” and 
for Jamal and his) are followed by a flashback to Carla, unaware of 
this pending disaster or her own part in it. This turn of events may 
seem to deny Carla’s hopes for the future, yet by ending the book 
60 Scl/Élc
with Carla rather than Quy, Brand implies that while the past can-
not be redeemed, the future may still be made anew. (106)
These comments open up a series of questions regarding the extent to 
which Carla and/or the novel is invested in futurity, and also the extent 
to which Carla is, in fact, unaware of her brother’s actions. In the final 
pages of the novel, Jamal severely beats, and perhaps even murders Quy: 
ghost beats ghost, baby kills baby face. But the ending does not isolate 
Jamal and Quy to their own scene of violence, nor is Carla necessarily 
unaware of Jamal’s actions. First of all, Carla admits that her father 
would never lend Jamal his Audi, and so she knows that her brother 
is already getting into trouble again. Even more importantly, there is 
a lingering possibility that Carla does have some awareness of Jamal’s 
actions in the sense that the series of events that ends in the beating 
seems to be narrated from Carla’s perspective. Immediately after Carla 
lists the activities that the decision to “live her life” will involve, the 
narration continues in a new paragraph that begins with the phrase “It 
won’t matter that Jamal left Carla’s place, cruised up Weston Road” 
(315) and goes on from there to relay Jamal’s beating of Quy, before 
returning to Carla again, who is alone in her apartment, longing to 
hear Tuyen working on her installation. The ambiguity of the narrative 
perspective here means that it is not clear when we leave Carla’s point of 
view for that of the omniscient narrator who follows Jamal, and when 
we return. As a result, how much Carla knows and does not know is not 
confirmed for readers. Therefore, the phrase “it won’t matter” does not 
come from a discernable source — at least this source is not initially dis-
cernable. Carla, readers will likely conclude, once having learned about 
the beating, will not end up having parties and going out to places with 
Tuyen. So it can be assumed that it is not Carla deciding that “it won’t 
matter.” Indeed, if we are to believe that she has not been “informed” 
of Jamal’s actions, perhaps all Carla knows is that Jamal is likely to get 
into more trouble, and that in divesting herself of any remaining sense 
of responsibility she has for him (deciding that she does not have to 
“hold the baby” anymore), she is finally free to pursue a fuller social life 
and also her potentially queer sexuality. However, since the narrative 
perspective has just been in Carla’s thoughts, it is impossible not to at 
least begin this paragraph that describes the beating without assuming 
that the declaration “it won’t matter” comes from Carla. While it is not 
logical to conclude that Carla could know where Jamal is going, readers 
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need to relocate their identification of the novel’s narrative perspective 
(and do so mid-sentence) in order to apply this logic to the events that 
ensue. In this way, it is the future of the text that determines the logic 
of the “it won’t matter” statement. 
The point here is that the novel plays with the very issue of know-
ability precisely at the moment that it posits the identification of a pos-
sibility of the “livable” as either an investment in the future or a rejec-
tion of it (or perhaps both). Whichever perspective the statement “it 
won’t matter” comes from, what reader would believe that this beating 
is not going to have an effect on Carla’s plans, and especially Carla and 
Tuyen’s budding romantic relationship? Does the novel challenge us to 
deny the significance of the future even as Carla would seem to affirm 
it by making plans for things she’s going to do? At this point, Brand 
seems less to grant Carla some sort of sense of promise than to test the 
durability of her readers’ investment in futurity by challenging them 
to maintain this investment beyond all logical reason. Here, readers 
find themselves at the “limit point of knowledge” on multiple counts, 
caught unaware in Edelman’s preferred territory, “the locus of negativ-
ity,” where that which is unknowable — in this case, the actions of the 
ghosts of race and diaspora and the effects these actions will have on 
the future — displaces the uncomplicated affirmation of the future 
(“Antagonism” 822). 
The Longings of Children
If what I have argued for so far is a recognition of the fact that Carla’s 
decision to “live her life,” and the ending of the novel as a whole, is 
based on Carla’s link to Jamal, and therefore to the political significance 
of Jamal’s arrested development, what I would like to raise by way of 
conclusion is the possibility of reading Carla as a child figure as well. 
After all, Carla has also felt the same impossibility of growing up in 
Toronto where “up” means to join a heterosexual- and white-dominant 
mainstream. This perpetual barring from the world of adulthood, this 
permanent delay enforced upon her own aging process by virtue of 
being racialized, is, of course, compounded by the fact that she loses 
her mother at such a young age. Throughout the novel, Carla is con-
stantly haunted by her own child self, through which she remembers 
and mourns her mother. She even goes to visit the apartment building 
where she and her mother lived and remarks that doing so makes her 
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feel “childish” (109). In fact, much of Carla’s presence in the novel takes 
place in the form of flashbacks to her childhood. 
If Carla is a child, then her longing upon which the novel ends — its 
last sentence is “She longed to hear Tuyen chipping and chiselling away 
next door” (318) — should not necessarily be read as an articulation of 
her sense of the promise of the future. Stockton argues that children’s 
longings are particularly removed from our capacity to know and under-
stand them. She goes so far as to suggest that “perhaps we stay focused 
on safeguarding children because we fear them. Perhaps we are threat-
ened by the spectre of their longings that are maddeningly, palpably 
opaque” (126). The adult world, the political realm, uses the child as its 
foundational figure upon which to confirm both the inevitable existence 
of the future and its own capacity to know what this future entails. But 
the irony is that this very child figure upon which the political depends 
thrusts a wrench into the concept of the determinable future when it 
comes to desire. Children’s desires are withheld from the adult’s capacity 
to know them. In other words, it is one thing for adults to desire some-
thing they call a future and to base this notion on the child, but there 
still remains the fact that children, those who cannot begin to know 
or understand this adult future, desire anyway. In this light, Carla’s 
longing is not a “coming out” into a queer identity and into the public 
sphere as a result of the assumption of this identity. Instead, her longing 
can be considered to have issued from the perspective of the child that 
we as adults, as knowers, as critical thinkers, can never access. This is 
the desiring child that stands not for the affirmable future but for our 
inability to know “what happens next” or what will come to constitute 
the human and the political realm in this “next.” When storytelling, 
according to Bruhm and Hurley, “removes the queer child from its 
present desires and projects it into a future where those desires will not 
have been,” Carla’s persistent childishness serves to resist this narrative 
progression and thereby safeguard Carla’s longing, a longing that is 
queer, at least in part, by virtue of this persistence (xxx). Clearly this 
condition of unknowing also precludes the possibility of determining — 
and, therefore, placing limits upon — types of people, including types 
determined by racial categories, and the imagination of futures reserved 
on behalf of these types of people. The ending of this novel is madden-
ingly opaque, and this opaqueness, its distinction from the political, is 
the site of What We All Long For’s most volatile politics. 
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Author’s Note
Many thanks to Aparna Mishra Tarc and to the anonymous reviewers for their generous 
and insightful comments on an earlier version of this essay.
Notes
1 In his review of What We All Long For, David Chariandy applauds the novel for 
offering “precisely what so many of us have longed to see both uncompromisingly and 
beautifully represented: a youthful lifetime of feeling different, and a future for feeling 
differently” (107). Diana Brydon has commented that Brand only “finds limited hope for 
the future through remapping emotional geographies and the subjectivities of the men and 
women who negotiate them” (95; emphasis added). 
2 Butler develops her theory of “livability” as part of her call for queer activists and 
theorists “to cease legislating for all lives what is livable only for some” (8).
3 Meanwhile, Heather Smyth has highlighted the significance of “provisionality” in 
the novel (275) as part of her argument that What We All Long For “offers a vocabulary and 
a poetics for how differences and alliances can crosscut foundational identity categories in 
unexpected ways” and that, ultimately, “Brand offers a vision of a politics of difference that 
may help us imagine our way out of the limits of multicultural discourse” (274).
4 According to Lauren Berlant, “the Butlerian progressive subject dismantles her patho-
logical sense of defensive sovereignty or sovereign indifference on behalf of a healthy non-
sovereign identification with those populations that need to be included in communities of 
compassion in order to gain access to the machineries of justice” (182). Brand’s depictions 
of Carla in relation to her mother, and also in relation to the justice system (the occasions 
when she visits her brother in jail, for example), would benefit from a substantiated analysis 
informed by Berlant’s attentions to the relationship between infantile attachments and 
“attachments to regimes of justice” in Cruel Optimism (184).
5 See, for example, the introduction to Inheriting the City: Children of Immigrants Come 
of Age, which points out that “different groups organize their lives in markedly different 
ways in terms of timing and sequencing major decisions in the transition to adulthood. 
They vary in when they leave home, finish their education, begin full time employment, 
find spouses or partners, and have children” (18). While Inheriting the City is an American 
publication, what is interesting here is the attention its authors pay to time and sequence as 
factors in the measure of second-generation immigrant experience.
6 In this respect, Judith Halberstam’s critique of the supposedly ideal trajectory from 
childhood to adulthood might be useful to apply to the Canadian government’s assessment 
of immigration’s successes and failures. Halberstam writes, “in Western cultures, we chart 
the emergence of the adult from the dangerous and unruly period of adolescence as a desired 
process of maturation; and we create longevity as the most desirable future, applaud the 
pursuit of long life (under any circumstances), and pathologize modes of living that show 
little or no concern for longevity” (In a Queer 4).
7 Hong builds her analysis in part from Avery Gordon’s Ghostly Matters: Haunting 
and the Sociological Imagination. See also Jasbir Puar’s discussion of race, temporality, and 
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